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HAWALA’S CHARM: WHAT BANKS CAN LEARN FROM 
INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
Hawala networks, or Informal Funds Transfer Systems (IFTS), are 
age-old means of conducting cross-border financial transactions. They 
thrive in regions where there is inadequate or nonexistent financial infra-
structure due to poverty, daunting geography, or endemic conflict. Such 
regions are home to poor and underserved communities hungry for and in 
desperate need of financial services. IFTS provide access to these relative-
ly ignored markets through the use of specific transactional mechanisms, 
payment modalities, and clearing and settlement options. With these inno-
vative and flexible techniques, IFTS have successfully tapped into the 
exponentially growing global remittance market. Hawala networks are 
also used by NGOs and humanitarian aid organizations operating in post-
conflict regions, and by diaspora communities looking to provide vital 
services for family members in their country of origin. IFTS, however, can 
also be illegitimately used for smuggling, capital flight, or terrorist activi-
ties. Formal financial institutions can learn how to better access the remit-
tance market and serve remote or poor communities by learning from the 
key operational characteristics that make IFTS so successful: speed and 
efficiency, accessibility and adaptability, affordability, anonymity, cultural 
sensitivity, and relational contracts. Understanding these operational 
characteristics can allow for innovative, Hawala-inspired inclusion tech-
niques to be incorporated into the formal infrastructure. Mobile banking, 
adaptive financial procedures and services, broad integration, and a shift 
in the banking culture would not only allow for formal financial institu-
tions to gain access to the lucrative remittance market, but would also 
improve access to financial services for the poor and underserved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Informal Funds Transfer Systems (IFTS), commonly called Hawala 
networks, are age-old methods of conducting financial transactions across 
various borders and cultures using a system of trust and social investment. 
IFTS thrive in regions where formal financial institutions dare not or can-
not succeed.1 IFTS do not operate in the shadowy leftovers of the formal 
regime,2 but rather enjoy prime access to the growing multi-billion dollar 
domestic and international remittance market.3 By understanding the oper-
ational characteristics that make IFTS so successful, formal banking insti-
tutions can learn how to successfully operate in warring, post-conflict, and 
developing regions, thus gaining access to a wider market of individuals.4 
Through the use of innovative financial inclusion techniques inspired by 
Hawala networks, formal institutions can become more competitive in the 
remittance market, and can help provide access to financial services in the 
poor and underserved regions of the world.5 
This Note will not attempt to criticize the various regulation mechan-
isms put in place to shut down, outwit, or destabilize the many existing 
IFTS, specifically Hawala as operated in the Middle East. Nor will this 
Note discuss in great detail the connection such informal systems have to 
black market or terrorist activities. There is a plethora of well-written and 
well-researched literature that covers both topics substantially.6 Rather, 
this Note will attempt to: (1) explain the characteristics that make IFTS so 
successful, and (2) identify lessons that formal banking institutions can 
learn from such systems in order to be more competitive in the lucrative 
remittance market. In turn, this analysis can give formal institutions the 
tools needed to provide increased access to financial services for poor and 
underserved communities in regions previously deemed uneconomical or 
inaccessible. 
Part I of this Note will provide background information on the various 
Informal Funds Transfer Systems, or Hawala networks, that cross ethnic 
and state boundaries.7 Part II will describe the basic transaction mechan-
isms and payment modalities that are used by IFTS.8 Part III will discuss 
                                                 
1 See infra Part I.A. 
2 See infra Part II.B. 
3 See infra Parts IV.A, V. 
4 See infra Part V. 
5 See infra Part VI. 
6 See infra note 136. 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See infra Part II. 
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the various clearing and settlement options, both complex and simple, that 
IFTS use to settle debts and balance payments.9 Part IV will briefly de-
scribe the four most common uses for IFTS: remittances; NGOs and hu-
manitarian aid assistance in conflict regions; international services for 
diaspora communities; and illegitimate uses, such as smuggling and capi-
tal flight.10 Part V will analyze the operational characteristics that make 
IFTS so successful in the remittance market.11 Part VI will propose pro-
grams, inspired by the key characteristics of IFTS, that formal financial 
institutions can implement as a means of competing for the remittance 
market and improving financial access to the poor in post-conflict and 
remote regions.12 
I.  INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS BACKGROUND 
A. Definition 
Hawala-type networks, or Informal Funds Transfer Systems, have 
been known across time and cultures by many different names, and they 
continue to successfully operate in all parts of the world.13 The World 
Bank and IMF have been explicit in using the term “Informal Funds 
Transfer Systems” for very specific reasons.14 The first reason is that such 
systems often function as the primary means of conducting financial trans-
actions in many areas of the world; therefore, referring to IFTS as “alter-
native remittance systems” would be inaccurate.15 Second, the term “un-
derground banking” is misleading because in communities where IFTS 
prosper, the systems frequently function openly, though not necessarily 
with formal or political acknowledgment.16 Third, as this Note will discuss 
in Part I.B infra, Hawala systems cross many borders, cultures, and reli-
gions, so referring to them as “ethnic banking” is unnecessarily restric-
                                                 
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 See infra Part VI. 
13 PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT S. SANDHU, INTERPOL GEN. SECRETARIAT, THE 
HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING 4 
(2000). 
14 MOHAMMED EL QORCHI, SAMUEL M. MAIMBO & JOHN F. WILSON, INFORMAL 
FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA SYSTEM 6 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund 2003) [hereinafter JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER]. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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tive.17 Fourth, the term IFTS more accurately reflects the fact that these 
systems operate using modalities very similar to those used in “conven-
tional” or “formal” banking systems.18 Finally, though only inferred by the 
World Bank and IMF, terms like “underground banking” merely enforce 
the negative stereotypes and connotations that have been associated with 
Hawala-type networks since September 11, 2001.19 It is for these reasons 
that this Note will only refer to such systems as Hawala, or IFTS, in order 
to avoid the negative connotations and confusing images created by other 
illegal transactions that often receive the same label.20 
Hawala in Arabic translates to “transfer,”21 and in Hindi it means 
“trust,” or a valuable item that is passed on to a trusted party for deli-
very.22 It is important to keep in mind that though this Note will use the 
term “Hawala” to represent IFTS, the term is used in some countries to 
refer to formal money transfers in commercial banking.23 The most com-
mon reference to Hawala, however, is in reference to informal financial 
systems. 
B. Historical Context 
IFTS existed long before formal banking, and they will continue to ex-
ist as banks rise and fall in various nations. Across the board, the primary 
purpose of Hawala-type transfer systems has been to facilitate trade be-
tween distant regions.24 The origins of these systems can be murky at 
times, but regardless of where the systems are centrally located, they tend 
to share a few common characteristics. 
1. Institutional Basis 
Before discussing the specific informal financial systems of ancient 
and medieval commerce, it is important to understand the institutional 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 John F. Wilson, Senior Economist, Middle E. Dep’t, Int’l Monetary Fund, Hawala 
and Other Informal Payment Systems: An Economic Perspective at the Seminar on Cur-
rent Developments in Monetary and Financial Law 1 (May 6, 2002), http://www.imf 
.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 6. 
22 Matthew Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the 
Hawala Financial System, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 405, 407 (2003). 
23 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 6. 
24 Id. at 10. 
2012] HAWALA’S CHARM 279 
 
developments that allowed for such systems to exist successfully. The 
majority of pre-modern merchants found themselves traveling through and 
operating in environments that lacked the formal mechanisms needed to 
conduct complex long-distance business transactions.25 Alternatively, 
where such formal systems did exist, “the state as an institution that en-
force[d] contracts and property rights and provide[d] public goods pose[d] 
a dilemma: [for a] state with sufficient coercive power to do these things 
also had the power to withhold protection or confiscate private wealth.”26 
Essentially, businessmen of the pre-modern world were left struggling 
with commercial systems that were incomplete, incapable of providing a 
working formal system, or subject to a political regime of the strength or 
corruptibility that would significantly decrease the merchants’ profit mar-
gin—a high price considering the means of travel at the time.27 Further-
more, if there was a formal system in place, it was often restricted to a 
particular tribal region, and the resulting “transaction radius within which 
business could be conducted under [a] protective wing ... was ... nar-
row.”28 When a merchant stepped outside this protective sphere, he was 
once again subject to the dangers mentioned above. 
Another impediment to the pre-modern transaction was the limited 
means of payment available across communities. Because hard currency, 
such as silver or gold bullion, was not readily available to everyone, and 
because reliance on a barter system subjected merchants to additional 
risks, a new means of transactional arrangement needed to be developed.29 
2. China 
The Tang Dynasty of 618–907 created an informal financial transfer 
system known as the Fei-ch’ien, or the Flying Money System.30 The Tang 
developed it as a means to cope with its robust economy, specifically the 
transference of tax revenues.31 The use of the Fei-ch’ien did not end with 
the fall of the Tang Dynasty. Between 1368 and 1644, the Ming Dynasty 
began to decrease its use of paper money, and instead used the now-classic 
informal remittance system for the majority of its financial transfers.32 The 
                                                 
25 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 406. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 406–07. 
30 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
280 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:273 
 
Ch’ing Dynasty continued to develop the system from 1644 to 1911.33 Fei-
ch’ien played a crucial role in the cotton trade when a cotton dyestuff 
network began to include money transfers in its services repertoire; as 
more dyestuff stores began to do the same, a “China-wide network” 
formed.34 
The Fei-ch’ien was especially useful in both the tea trade35 and as for-
eign actors expanded into China.36 As a means of avoiding foreign-
controlled financial intermediaries and colonial powers, “money changers, 
gold dealers, and trading companies” used the informal system to prosper 
under colonial repression.37 
3. India 
India’s ancient informal financial system, now illegal but still in use, is 
known as Hundi.38 Early forms of bills of exchange and other promissory 
notes appear to have been the primary means of conducting pre-modern 
Hundi transactions, because there has been no evidence found of paper 
money or negotiable instruments in ancient India.39 
Hundi was developed under a “strong body of rules, usage, and cus-
toms” that received government recognition, so much so that these bills of 
exchange were circulated amongst Indian bankers for intrastate trade, 
integrated into the modern banking system, and defended on occasion by 
the courts on behalf of the business community.40 It was only after the 
infamous Jain Hawala scandal, in which bribes and political corruption 
dominated the headlines in the 1990s, that Hundi became completely il-
legal.41 Prior to the scandal, the local Hundi customs and usages were still 
permitted by the legislature.42 
Hundi spread north from the subcontinent as traders conducted busi-
ness with India’s neighbors, specifically Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.43 
It is possible that Hundi’s use began to spread north during the time of the 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Rachana Pathak, Note, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm 
or a Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2007, 2010–11 (2004). 
36 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 11 box 4.1. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 10 n.12, 11 box 4.1. 
42 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11 box 4.1. 
43 Id. at 10. 
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Mughal Empire.44 Informal transfers became particularly important when 
currency export between India and Pakistan was made illegal around the 
time of the 1947 partition.45 
4. Europe 
In Europe, the development of banking activity can be credited in part 
to the prevalent use of bills of exchange, which are “an obligation in the 
form of a payment order addressed to the [payee].”46 Bills of exchange 
were first widely used in Italy during the fourteenth century by money 
exchangers conducting remittance transactions.47 Towards the end of the 
sixteenth century, bills of exchange spread through France and England as 
a means of facilitating domestic trade and personal transactions.48 
5. Middle East 
The Muslim-majority world is most commonly associated with Hawa-
la, especially after Americans became aware of the word following 9/11.49 
Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the history of Hawala in the Middle 
East and Arabic world has not been well documented.50 The primary pur-
pose of Hawala was to assist in trading with multiple regions, within fief-
doms of varying distances, and between areas of varying terrain.51 Scho-
lars suggest it evolved specifically to avoid robbery along the silk trading 
route.52 Another theory is that it developed when the South Asian diaspora 
communities in pre-modern East Africa needed a means to settle ac-
counts.53 
The term Hawala, as a legal concept, can be found in Arabic texts dat-
ing back to 1327.54 While it began as a classic delegation of payment or 
transfer, various contractual obligations and parameters began to take 
                                                 
44 Pathak, supra note 35, at 2011. 
45 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10 (“[A]fter ... 1947, virtually 
no payment connected with trade with India and Pakistan was transacted through 
banks.”). 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
50 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11. 
51 Id. 
52 See Pathak, supra note 35, at 2011 & n.17. 
53 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11. 
54 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 407. 
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shape in accordance with developing Islamic legal traditions.55 This al-
lowed Hawala to expand its scope beyond the relatively common hard 
currency issues of the pre-modern Middle East, and into an institution 
built to decrease the uncertainties and risks involved in cross-border deal-
ings.56 
C. Common Aspects 
As mentioned, although the word Hawala is most often associated with 
the Middle East and Muslim communities, the various informal funds 
transfer systems all share similar key traits. The first is that such informal 
transactions almost inevitably cross international lines.57 The second cha-
racteristic, a logical conclusion of the first, is that such transactions will 
involve more than one currency.58 Third, the transactions involve principal 
and intermediary parties59 who have a financial position in core and peri-
pheral transactions.60 
II.  TRANSACTION MECHANISMS 
A. Basics 
From simple to complex, an informal funds transfer involves a specific 
set of parties who vary in number based on the complexity and sophistica-
tion of the transaction. The “hawaladar”61 is the broker, money remitter, or 
money exchange dealer whom the client contacts in order to initiate a 
transfer.62 Clients range from businesses to individuals. The classic exam-
ple involves an immigrant in Country A seeking to send money back to his 
family overseas in Country B. The hawaladar in Country A receives the 
money from the client, in addition to a small fee for his services.63 For the 
street exchange value of the amount given,64 Hawaladar A contacts his 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Wilson, supra note 19, at 2. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 410. 
61 Used interchangeably with the term broker throughout this Note. 
62 See Smriti S. Nakhasi, Comment, Western Unionizing the Hawala?: The Privatiza-
tion of Hawalas and Lender Liability, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 477 (2007); Samuel 
M. Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in 
Afghanistan 3 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 13, 2003). 
63 Pathak, supra note 35, at 2013–14. 
64 Wilson, supra note 19, at 8. 
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associate in Country B, generally via phone or email, to communicate the 
password, amount, and even payment location.65 A then provides his client 
with a code or password, which the client then passes along to the receiv-
ing party.66 Hawaladar B will then release the funds to the party providing 
the code or password.67 Once A has passed along the information to his 
counterpart, A’s part in the transaction is complete, and usually any writ-
ten records are eliminated to preserve the privacy of the parties.68 B will 
do the same once payment has been issued.69 On average, a Hawala trans-
action will take less than twenty-four hours to complete.70 
Even though no hard currency has been transferred across state lines, 
the transaction still does not result in a mysterious movement of money as 
the headlines like to depict.71 Informal transfers have similar accounting 
details to international transactions occurring through formal banking 
channels; the only difference is that one transaction is regulated and the 
other is not.72 In fact, many informal funds transfers indirectly involve the 
formal system. Although the hawaladar “does not depend on a compli-
cated infrastructure” in order to conduct his business, he often uses an 
“officially established checking account” associated to his name or small 
business.73 A majority of international hawaladars hold at least one or two 
accounts with formal financial institutions.74 This account is where the 
hawaladar deposits the client’s funds or withdraws funds for the benefi-
ciary.75 For all intents and purposes, the hawaladar’s designated bank 
account functions and acts as a bank financing the informal transactions.76 
B. Payment Modalities 
The payment modalities involved with informal transactions are also 
very similar to formal international transactions. It is rare for physical cash 
                                                 
65 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408. 
66 Nakhasi, supra note 62, at 477. 
67 Id. 
68 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. 
71 See JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing the mislead-
ing assertion that informal transactions result in money submerging on one side and 
popping out in a village across the world). 
72 Id. 
73 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408–09. 
74 Maimbo, supra note 62, at 7. 
75 Id. 
76 See Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 409 (discussing “bank within a bank” as-
sertions). 
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to move across borders in either formal or informal transfers. For example, 
when conducting a remittance payment or international transfer, be it 
through one’s bank or Western Union, no physical funds are moved. In-
stead, the transaction can be described as follows: 
[T]ransmission of a payment order is ... based on a receipt of some 
funds at the remitting end of the transaction. Actual payment is made to 
the beneficiary out of balances at the receiving end; settlement follows 
or, in cases where there are no exchange control issues, institutional ac-
counts can be debited/credited ....77 
Again, no physical money is being moved, yet the public does not 
deem such transactions as mysterious or underground, even though “nei-
ther formal nor informal financial systems necessarily transfer funds from 
one jurisdiction to another. Instead they depend on a sequence of account-
ing debits and credits among accounts kept by a network of individuals, 
companies, accountants, [and other relevant parties].”78 In the formal sys-
tem, these types of exchanges are known as Balance of Payment Ac-
counts, because the transaction is “intrinsically paired with an internation-
al capital flow.”79 The ability for a client to send funds internationally is 
enabled by the fact that there are two parties willing to finance the remit-
tance transaction through cross-border asset and liability exchanges.80 The 
same willingness must exist in the informal systems, except that the will-
ing parties are individuals rather than formal institutions or banks. 
III. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OPTIONS 
A. Consolidation: Retail versus Wholesale Brokers 
Because most informal funds transactions are rather complicated, and 
because of the imbalances that result on the hawaladars’ accounts—
especially when handling remittances—a multi-tiered system has evolved 
within the various IFTS.81 Frequently, “[i]ndividual ‘retail’ hawaladars 
settle their balances with a local ‘wholesale’ hawaladar who eventually 
balances the consolidated local transfer balance with his counterparts in 
other localities.”82 This allows for the balance of sums on the account to 
                                                 
77 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14. 
78 Maimbo, supra note 62, at 8. 
79 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 17. 
80
 Id. 
81 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408 n.1. 
82 Id. 
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be cleared.83 Wholesale broker (hawaladar) set-ups are especially useful in 
cases where the incoming and outgoing payments between brokers are 
from numerous remittance transactions.84 For example, during the 1990s, 
the Xawilaad85 of Somalia were incorporated as franchises into the agent 
networks of larger enterprises that specialized in money transfers.86 This 
created a centralized hub in which to consolidate and settle debts.87 
The development of wholesale brokers indicates a vast network that 
has found a means of consolidating accounts in order to streamline the 
cost of settlement. In fact, where “regulatory environments and market 
size permit, there has been a growing ‘professionalization’ and develop-
ment of the larger [wholesale] enterprises.”88 It would be rather costly for 
small-scale operators, functioning in multiple continents, to deal with 
countless small positions, both incoming and outgoing.89 The wholesale 
hawaladars consolidate the small positions into larger subtotals, and then 
conduct business with other large-scale hawaladar operations.90 The IFTS 
have developed various settlement procedures to further handle the ac-
count balances described above. 
B. Simple Reverse Transaction 
A simple reverse transaction is a basic tit-for-tat transaction in which 
incoming equals outgoing, but such easy balancing rarely occurs for two 
reasons. First, as mentioned previously, there is a “low probability that 
Hawala remittances from Country B to Country A would pass through the 
same hawaladars” as another remittance traveling from Country A to 
Country B.91 The second, more relevant reason, is that aggregate remit-
tance flows are largely asymmetrical between countries.92 Countries with 
                                                 
83 Id. at 408. 
84 Id. at 408 & n.1. For example, a U.S.-based hawaladar is unlikely to be able to bal-
ance his account from income transfers with his hawaladar counterpart in Somalia, be-
cause the influx of funds from Somalia to the U.S. would not be at an equivalent rate. 
85 Xawilaad is the Somali rendering of Hawala and means “transfer of debt.” Anna 
Lindley, Between “Dirty Money” and “Development Capital”: Somali Money Transfer 
Infrastructure Under Global Scrutiny, 108 AFR. AFF. 519, 522 (2009). 
86 Id. at 523. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 533. 
89 Wilson, supra note 19, at 6. 
90 Id. The IMF and World Bank are unclear on how to classify these larger operations; 
in fact, some experts believe they should not be classified as hawaladars. Id. (discussing 
how in Dubai these wholesale hawaladars are referred to as “exchange houses”). 
91 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14. 
92 Wilson, supra note 19, at 7. 
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large immigrant populations or migrant workers are the logical sources of 
net remittances, and countries with large emigrant populations are the 
natural recipients of net remittances. For example, the United States will 
have large outflows, and Latin American countries will have large inflows, 
but aggregately, it is unlikely that Latin American countries will expe-
rience large outflows and the United States will experience large in-
flows.93 
C. Complex Reverse Transaction 
Complex reverse transactions are an option commonly used when 
transactions involve a country that is subject to costly exchange controls 
or currency restrictions.94 These transactions incorporate the idea of a 
multi-tiered system.95 An illustration of this system is as follows: Broker A 
has an unsettled position with Broker B. B receives local currency from his 
client, who wants to send it to Country C. However, B is unable to com-
plete this transaction for a variety of reasons, the most common of which 
is an unfavorable exchange rate.96 To solve this problem, B would need 
the assistance of an outside party. B could, for example, seek help from A, 
if A is able to recommend a broker in Country C. In such a case, A is 
usually an associate of the broker in Country C, or knows Broker C due to 
an unsettled position between the two from a previous transaction.97 A can 
instruct C to have the funds available for B, or B can deal directly with C, 
and can instruct A to settle the transaction. This would avoid the currency 
control issue and would clear the initial position between A and B.98 
D. Bilateral Settlement 
1. Financial Settlement through Banks 
A bilateral financial settlement through a bank rarely happens, but if 
one were to occur, Hawaladar A would deposit money directly into Hawa-
ladar B’s account in order to clear an earlier position or debt.99 The bank’s 
foreign exchange rate, however, would be triggered by this action, because 
                                                 
93 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14. 
94 Wilson, supra note 19, at 7. 
95 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408 n.1. 
96 Wilson, supra note 19, at 8. 
97 JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 15. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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the banks are in different countries.100 The more common method of con-
ducting a bilateral settlement would be for A to simply deposit the initial 
client’s money into B’s foreign account.101 
2. Settlement through Import/Export Clearing 
Settling through import/export clearing is similar to bilateral settle-
ment through a bank, but it involves the import/export of goods. Such 
bilateral trade can manifest in a few ways. During the initial transaction, 
after receiving the client’s funds, Hawaladar A could simply send goods to 
Hawaladar B. These goods, such as jewels, gold, or electronics, would 
amount to the payment B makes available to the beneficiary.102 A could 
also, in a later transaction, finance imports to Country B or pay for the 
imported goods.103 As a result, exports from Country A to Country B are 
paid for by the balances due between Hawaladars A and B.104 For example, 
at the end of the month, if an outstanding balance exists between A in 
Afghanistan and B in Australia, B can use a Japanese bank account to 
purchase cars for export to Afghanistan. Once the cars arrive, they would 
be transferred to A’s care, and A can sell them for profit.105 This transac-
tion would thus clear the outstanding balance between the two parties. 
E. Multilateral Trade 
Similar to the bilateral importing or exporting of goods to balance ac-
counts, multilateral trading of goods incorporates the wholesale, large-
scale operators mentioned above. Multilateral trade can manifest itself in 
countless scenarios. An example would be when Broker A pays, on behalf 
of Broker C, for a series of wholesale exports sent from Country C to 
Country B.106 Another such scenario could involve Broker B transferring 
his claim with A to an associate in Country D. Because B has an open 
position with D, A will send the exports to D, thus clearing both balances. 
Such transactions can become increasingly complicated and create a ro-
bust influx of goods into a market, but each time they result in a chain of 
transactions that are entirely invisible to financial regulations.107 
                                                 
100 Id. app. 1 at 30 tbl.A1.2. 
101 Id. at 15. 
102 Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408. 
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F. Misstatement and Over/Under Invoicing 
The misstatement of trade values on invoices is a means of settlement 
that involves over- and under-invoicing import/export transactions. Rather 
than concealing an import, as occurs in smuggling, the imports are record-
ed under value, thus reimbursing a hawaladar with an open position.108 In 
addition, “the importer [or hawaladar] in Country B may also benefit from 
reduced tariff payments,” which can help slowly clear the accounts be-
tween Hawaladar B and Hawaladar A.109 Over numerous transactions, the 
positions will eventually balance out as the over- and under-invoicing of 
goods slowly benefits one or both hawaladars. 
G. Smuggling 
The next logical means of settlement by trade is smuggling. This Note 
will go into more detail about the smuggling opportunities some IFTS 
offer,110 but the simplicity of smuggling mechanisms warrants brief men-
tion. For example, should Hawaladar B be entitled to a specific quantity of 
goods after a transaction with Hawaladar A,111 A can settle the balance by 
accepting the risk and smuggling the goods into Country B on behalf of 
Hawaladar B. 
H. International Services 
One of the most common settlement options is the provision of inter-
national services, such as travel, medical treatment, or educational 
funds.112 Hawaladar B provides these services to the beneficiaries in 
Country B, or to himself, but the services are financed by Hawaladar A, a 
client, or one of the consolidated wholesalers mentioned above.113 The 
purchasing of services provides another means to avoid currency controls, 
because a client or hawaladar can opt to purchase the services with local 
currency rather than dealing with the hassles of currency controls.114 
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I. International Investment and Capital Flight 
The final method of settlement that brokers can use to clear balances is 
through international investment. For example, rather than Hawaladar B 
having a foreign bank account, B and his partners can purchase various 
assets, such as bonds, stocks, or real estate.115 The purchases are made in 
exchange for the balance owed by Hawaladar A, and A pays for the assets 
in the name of B or B’s partners.116 Such transactions represent yet another 
intersection between formal and informal transfer systems. Furthermore, 
they illustrate the most common method used to engage in capital flight, 
because “the [final holder] of services or assets never actually purchases 
foreign exchange.”117 This settlement method is commonly used in coun-
tries where citizens are restricted or prohibited from owning foreign as-
sets.118 
IV. USES 
IFTS provide a variety of uses, and offer a diverse set of both legiti-
mate and illegitimate services, depending on the region and value being 
transferred. The most common legitimate uses for IFTS are remittances, 
NGO or humanitarian aid, and services. Illegitimate uses encompass capi-
tal flight, black market dealings, evasion, and terrorist activities. 
A. Remittances 
Remittance transactions occur primarily in countries with large immi-
grant or migrant worker populations.119 IFTS serve as a cheap and conve-
nient means for immigrant families to send money to relatives in their 
country of origin, or for migrant workers to send money to family in more 
remote parts of the state.120 Afghanistan alone has nearly 30% of its popu-
lation externally and internally displaced, and remittances from outside of 
Afghanistan are received by about 15% of the rural population, which is 
20% of their average expenditure.121 These transactions are often small 
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enough that banks would not generally view them as profitable endea-
vors.122 Companies like Western Union are the formal options for trans-
mitting remittances, but unlike IFTS, Western Union has limited access to 
remote and war-torn areas.123 
B. NGOs and Humanitarian Aid 
Organizations that operate in emerging conflict, warring, or post-
conflict regions must make use of the local IFTS in order to fund and 
conduct relief operations.124 Essentially, these transactions act like large-
scale remittances.125 Transporting large amounts of physical cash is often 
expensive, dangerous, and logistically impossible.126 In countries where 
humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction operations are occur-
ring, the formal banking systems are non-existent, destroyed, corrupt, or 
non-operational.127 
For example, in Kabul during and after the Taliban’s regime, the ha-
waladars were the only active and reliable financial actors, offering finan-
cial and non-financial services to local, regional, and international 
clients.128 As a result, foreign and local aid agencies found themselves 
using the Hawala system in order to transfer sums ranging from USD 
$100,000 to $1,000,000.129 In fact, “[n]early all nongovernmental organi-
zations, aid donors, and development agencies used the Hawala system to 
deliver humanitarian relief and developmental aid to Afghanistan and to 
move funds around the country.”130 The organizations found there was no 
limit to how much the hawaladars of Kabul were capable of transfer-
ring.131 Furthermore, transfer fees averaged from 1–2%, and most transfers 
were completed in twenty-four hours.132 
                                                                                                                         
bank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/AFRFW_3_Challenges_of_Regulating_and_S
upervising_Hawaladars.htm. 
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viewed as a major source of global financial flow with significant impacts on the country 
of origin. See infra Part V.A. 
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C. Services 
Another very important use that IFTS provide is the ability for indi-
viduals or families to pay for services overseas. This can range from 
something as trivial as travel expenses to something as important as col-
lege tuition or medical bills.133 Especially in emergency medical situa-
tions, immigrant populations find IFTS extremely helpful in quickly send-
ing money back to relatives or elderly parents. 
D. Illegitimate Uses 
The use of IFTS among smugglers, terrorists, and other black market 
operations has been widely covered.134 As discussed previously, the in-
formal systems can easily be used for capital flight and customs eva-
sions.135 More pertinent to current events is that IFTS give terrorist organ-
izations the ability to transfer money under the radars of various federal 
and international agencies.136 Furthermore, many IFTS in post-conflict 
regions exhibit exploitative tendencies, because they are the only financial 
options available in a particular area.137 Lack of access to records and 
ambiguous settlement procedures allow for IFTS to be vulnerable to abuse 
by those in control.138 In Afghanistan, for example, the hawaladars are not 
required to open their books for inspection or auditing under Afghani 
law.139 This makes it very difficult to trace transactions ending with or 
stemming from terrorist organizations or exploitive hawaladars. 
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V.  COMPETING IN THE REMITTANCE MARKET 
Understanding and learning from the success of IFTS provides the 
formal banking regime with the key to simultaneously unlock the lucrative 
remittance market and to gain further financial access to various under-
served communities. Although remittance transactions may seem small 
and unremarkable at first glance, “[w]orldwide annual remittances amount 
to more than one hundred billion dollars,” sent either from an industria-
lized nation to a developing one or within developing or conflict re-
gions.140 With such continuous growth in the international and domestic 
remittance markets, it is important for formal banking institutions to un-
derstand why IFTS dominate certain markets, and to use these lessons to 
improve the formal remittance transfer system and financial infrastructure 
in challenging areas. 
A. The Remittance Market 
The impact of the remittance market will not diminish with time as 
global migration flows continue to expand and grow. In fact, total remit-
tance flows continue to increase and have doubled in a period of less than 
ten years.141 Remittances have a significant impact on the receiving coun-
try, particularly those with a large diaspora population abroad. The coun-
try of Guyana, for example, has a population of approximately 700,000, 
but the Guyanese diaspora numbers over half a million, allowing remit-
tances to comprise at least 10% of Guyana’s GDP.142 Small countries are 
not the sole beneficiaries of remittances. India, even as a rapidly rising 
global power, is the world’s largest remittance recipient.143 Indian remit-
tance transactions represent roughly 73% of remittance flows to South 
Asia and 15% worldwide.144 In Central and Latin America, Mexico domi-
nates with 34% of the remittances to the region and 8% worldwide, and in 
Southeast Asia, the Philippines takes in 43% for the region and 8% 
worldwide.145 
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The flow of remittances impacts not only the receiving country but al-
so the country in which the immigrants now reside. Global migration 
flows indicate that both unskilled, or “high-volume,” and skilled, or “high-
value,” workers emigrate.146 While the prevailing stereotype suggests that 
unskilled migrants send money back home to relatives, the “[growing] 
movement of highly skilled, highly trained professionals”147 leads to the 
logical conclusion that remittance rates will continue to rise exponentially, 
because these immigrants will have access to significantly more disposa-
ble income. 
Finally, remittance flow impacts the domestic finances and policies of 
a state, especially states with significant population movement from rural 
to urban areas, 148 and states experiencing civil unrest, political violence, 
natural disasters, or war. 149 
There is, however, often a discrepancy between what the IMF or 
World Bank estimate, and what central state banks estimate with regard to 
the flow of remittances into a given country. For example, the World Bank 
reported in 2002 roughly $2 billion in remittances to the Philippines, whe-
reas the Philippines’ central bank reported over $6 billion.150 This discre-
pancy is further exacerbated by the fact that central banks often signifi-
cantly under-report informal funds transfers, and because remittances 
conducted via direct deposit do not register as remittance transactions.151 
It is extremely important to remember that the sending of money back 
to one’s country of origin—to parents, family, or friends—is often simply 
a cultural characteristic of many immigrant families, and not necessarily 
about the money itself.152 
                                                 
146 Orozco, supra note 140, at 1. Examples of unskilled, high-volume immigrants are 
those who work in the textile industry or manual labor. Examples of skilled, high-value 
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149 See Nakhasi, supra note 62, at 487. 
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151 Id. at 3. 
152 For example, as done in this author’s family, in the Indian culture the giving of 
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B. Difficulties of Formal Remittances 
Most international remittance transfers occur through licensed regional 
or international businesses.153 Western Union is the largest example of 
such a company.154 Domestic remittances, frequently evidenced by mi-
grant workers in urban cities sending money home to their families in rural 
villages, often can be sent via the post office.155 However, all of these 
formal options, including banks, face the same obstacles, namely cost and 
accessibility. 
In a recent study by the Centre for Micro Finance at the Institute for 
Financial Management Research and the Reserve Bank of India’s College 
for Agricultural Banking, 274 domestic migrant workers and their families 
were interviewed on how they conducted their personal banking.156 The 
intent of the study was to understand how various remittance channels 
were utilized in India.157 More than half of the respondents (57%) indi-
cated that they used IFTS to transfer money back to their families.158 Only 
13% of the workers used the Indian Post to transfer funds, and 30% used 
the banks to transfer funds.159 The Post was found to be the most costly 
option: 5% of the total transfer fee, plus another 1% in bribes, not to men-
tion indirect costs.160 Meanwhile, banks’ average fee was 3% of the total 
transfer, but respondents cited lack of accessibility as the primary disad-
vantage for banks.161 The banks were either too difficult to reach, required 
too many documents to open an account, or involved too long of a wait. 
Total time to make a transaction through the bank, meaning travel and 
wait time, was 2.5 hours on average.162 IFTS, on the other hand, averaged 
a 4.6% transfer fee, including incidental costs such as bribes or travel 
costs, but an average wait time of only forty-eight minutes.163 
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More often than not, poor domestic or international migrant workers 
are excluded from the formal payment system because it is unsatisfactory 
and expensive. As a result they must depend on IFTS. The IFTS succeed 
where formal institutions cannot for the reasons discussed below. 
C. IFTS’ Operational Characteristics 
The formal international banking system has much to learn from the 
success of IFTS like Hawala. Of particular note are the operational charac-
teristics that make IFTS so effective in regions where formal banking has 
failed. These operational characteristics reflect the concerns of the partici-
pant customers and, unlike the formal system, work to alleviate many of 
these problems. 
1. Efficiency and Speed 
One of the primary concerns of parties trying to conduct a remittance 
transaction is the speed with which the money will arrive. As mentioned 
previously, remittances are often used to provide emergency services or 
pay bills for relatives in another country. Between major international 
cities, the average informal funds transfer takes between six and twelve 
hours.164 When the informal funds exchange is between countries in dif-
ferent time zones or with different languages,165 the transaction can occur 
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours; however, if the remittance is being 
sent to an extremely rural area, an area with limited telecommunication 
technology, or a village without a local hawaladar’s office, the transaction 
can take slightly longer.166 In contrast, a typical formal transaction through 
a bank can take up to a week.167 
The informal funds transfer is also not hampered by state government 
and international regulation requirements that exist in many countries 
throughout South Asia, Europe, and the United States.168 As is to be ex-
pected, the bureaucracy of the formal sector slows any transaction, both 
financial and non-financial, to a rate that makes it unable to compete with 
the informal sector.169 
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The ideal time frames discussed above are still better than what the 
formal sector is actually able to provide.170 In countries with little to no 
financial infrastructure—often due to conflict—banks simply cannot oper-
ate or conduct any type of transaction.171 Afghanistan provides a clear 
illustration of the IFTS’ resilience when compared to formal institutions: 
due to the prolonged conflict in that country, the banking infrastructure 
has been significantly damaged, but an informal transfer to Kabul from a 
major foreign city will only take from six to twelve hours, and one from 
Kabul to regional centers within Afghanistan will take under twenty-four 
hours.172 
2. Accessibility and Adaptability 
Accessibility and adaptability are two characteristics that operate in 
tandem, because IFTS’ customers come from a plethora of nations, many 
of which might be suffering from endemic conflict, financial troubles, or 
growing industrialization.173 Often there is a complete lack of faith in the 
formal banking system of the country of origin.174 Also, many of these 
banks lack the capacity or infrastructure needed to conduct international or 
domestic remittances.175 Unlike formal banks, IFTS can operate in very 
unstable conditions, because the core of an informal funds transfer simply 
relies on the ability of two individuals to communicate with each other by 
any means necessary.176 This flexibility is also crucial on a more individu-
al basis, as it can allow participants who are perhaps illiterate, or do not 
speak the language, to send money to their country or city of origin with-
out having to open a bank account or write a check.177 
This adaptability is helpful not only for countries suffering from con-
flict but also for those suffering from an economic crisis or a natural disas-
ter.178 For example, after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, Pakistan’s for-
eign exchange liquidity was so badly debilitated that even the large influx 
of humanitarian aid and remittances did not meet the foreign exchange 
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requirements needed by the formal sector.179 As a result, IFTS became a 
necessary avenue through which aid could flow, because banks were es-
sentially stonewalling the desperately needed funds.180 Haiti is another 
example of this problem: an IFTS could have been a method of acquiring 
funds in Haiti during the post-earthquake aftermath. Haitian banks did not 
open until January 23rd, 2010, nearly ten days after the earthquake hit,181 
and the existing payment structure was left in shambles by the disaster. 182 
3. Affordability 
The cost of conducting transactions is another customer concern that 
IFTS can alleviate, but the formal sector cannot.183 The average cost of 
transferring funds through an IFTS, between major international cities, 
ranges between 2–5% of the value being transferred.184 This fee range is 
based on the relationship between the parties, the destination, the curren-
cy, the amount being transferred, and the negotiating skills of the parties 
involved.185 Because many hawaladars operate other businesses that re-
quire money transfers—such as import/export exchanges, jewelry shops, 
ethnic grocery stores, and travel agencies—they already have the mechan-
isms in place to conduct remittance transactions.186 In fact, a hawaladar 
can conduct business right from his or her home. All that is needed is a 
telecommunication device: a phone, fax machine, or computer with inter-
net access.187 This simple infrastructure creates very low overhead as 
compared to the formal system, further bringing down transactional costs 
for customers.188 
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4. Anonymity 
Virtually all IFTS have very little in the way of standard documentary 
procedures or accounting requirements, and thus ensure some degree of 
anonymity.189 IFTS do not require much paperwork, if any, to start or 
open an account.190 There is no minimum balance or minimum transfer 
amount. This is an especially important feature for low-income workers 
trying to send money home, and for low-income families trying to receive 
that money. Furthermore, it is very rare for a hawaladar to keep records of 
individual or retail transactions; rather, they will keep track of the whole-
sale transactions mentioned earlier.191 Remittance transactions, if ever 
recorded, are often written in code, in very ambiguous or general terms, or 
in such inconsequential amounts that the average observer would not even 
notice the transaction.192 One can equate this to note-taking in a class. 
Most individuals have their own system of taking notes, and often another 
person trying to decipher those notes can find the task virtually impossi-
ble. As discussed earlier, the only customer identification that is required 
in most informal funds transfers is the code transmitted to the benefi-
ciary.193 Even this code, along with any other identifying documents, is 
usually destroyed upon the completion of the transaction.194 
The most important aspect of anonymity in informal funds transfers is 
the fact that formal identification is not required.195 This factor might be 
difficult for some to understand, but in many cultures, the communities do 
not feel protected by the state.196 In the past, merchants in the Middle East 
and Africa rarely felt protected by the state, because unlike their European 
counterparts, the states lacked a “protectionist” attitude towards the middle 
class and communities from different tribes or clans.197 IFTS fill the needs 
of the community in a way that the formal system cannot. For example, 
“[i]n the post-September 11, 2001 world, typical users of the [IFTS], [es-
pecially] those of Middle Eastern ... descent, already are highly sensitized 
to the heightened government scrutiny” and intrusion of privacy.198 As 
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such, “[t]hose users are unlikely to prefer a system replete with records 
and paper trails [and] [e]ven legitimate customers ... may desire anonymi-
ty and hesitate to draw unwanted attention to themselves or their families 
overseas.”199 The cultural idiosyncrasies of a community play a significant 
role in the remittance market and IFTS as a whole. 
5. Cultural Context and Sensitivity 
Sensitivity to various cultures and adaptability to local community 
needs is a key operational characteristic that puts IFTS far ahead of the 
formal banking institutions, both in the remittance market and in accessing 
the poor and underserved.200 The concept of sending remittances is one 
born of both necessity and tradition, but not all diaspora communities or 
domestic migrants can afford the time, energy, and money required to 
send funds or services through formal channels.201 In illiterate or poorly 
educated migrant communities, a friendly, local hawaladar is a far more 
appealing individual to entrust with the handling of hard-earned funds than 
a faceless bank.202 This cultural sensitivity factors in at the originating and 
receiving ends of the transaction.203 For example, in Somalia, money 
transmitters usually recruit agents through clan connections.204 Middle 
Eastern communities, on the other hand, are the most popular example 
with regard to IFTS’ cultural context. In very conservative diaspora com-
munities with more restrictive traditions, a trusted hawaladar who respects 
or understands the social mores of the community would be viewed as an 
“acceptable intermediary” with whom to conduct business.205 
6. Trust through Relational Contracts 
Though many of these operational characteristics that make IFTS so 
successful cannot realistically be implemented by the formal system to 
improve competitiveness in the remittance market, there is at least an 
overarching lesson to be gleaned from IFTS: trust through relational con-
tracts. All of the operational characteristics rely on an innate semblance of 
trust with the broker and within the IFTS community.206 Because of this 
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social element within the IFTS, there is very rarely fraud or a failure to 
transfer funds, unlike with commercial options such as Western Union.207 
Hawala’s high rate of success and reliability is accomplished by creating 
incentives to perform and minimizing risks and costs.208 
International transfers—whether of goods, services, or money—are 
extremely risky.209 The moment a client hands over the money, he is ex-
posed to the risk of being held up by a hawaladar, who faces virtually no 
consequences in an unregulated system.210 IFTS, however, are able to 
establish internal legal safeguards ensuring completion of the transaction, 
because the system breaks the risky transactions into palatable bite-size 
pieces, “break[ing] down a direct transaction between ... parties that would 
be encumbered by prohibitively high transaction costs and risks into a 
series of [smaller] transactions.”211 This reduces risk and promotes per-
formance.212 IFTS turn the risky exchange into a “self-fulfilling con-
tract[]” by requiring personal investment,213 thus making it a reliable 
transaction.214 The extent of a hawaladar’s clientele depends on his reputa-
tion with the surrounding community; failure to comply will result in 
expulsion from the hawaladar network and “blacklisting.”215 As a result, 
with every informal transaction there is a personal interest at stake for all 
parties involved, especially for the broker.216 This investment is the hawa-
ladar’s social capital, which in turn helps build his reputation.217 A vested 
interest born of concern for reputation cultivates an emphasis on long-term 
relationships rather than opportunistic ones, which further limits risk and 
promotes performance.218 
The IFTS’ ability to induce such an investment without formal regula-
tions has been explained using the economic clubs theory, which discusses 
the bridge between private and public goods.219 Specifically, “a club is a 
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voluntary group of people gaining mutual benefits from sharing either 
production costs, special members’ characteristics, or a good that can be 
characterized by excludable benefits.”220 Based on this definition, IFTS 
sound like fairly typical clubs. By creating shared benefits, also known as 
public goods, IFTS are able to overcome the opportunism that often pla-
gues high-risk transactions such as international monetary transfers.221 
Establishing and preserving one’s reputation within the club, which is 
needed for success, can be viewed as an investment of social capital.222 
This capital becomes a public good because the existence of the informal 
funds transfer “club” relies on the characteristics of the investments placed 
into it.223 Simply being a member of an IFTS, which occurs upon making 
an initial investment, does not result in any payoff; rather, a member must 
continue to make as many investments as possible, which in this case 
would be the financial transactions.224 
Finally, customary or unwritten law also acts as a means of enforce-
ment to further strengthen the emphasis on trust, community, and social 
capital across networks.225 This was especially evident in Somalia, where 
agents were dealing with agents from other clans.226 
VI.  IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE BY APPLYING IFTS’ 
CHARACTERISTICS TO FORMAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
This analysis of IFTS across the globe matters to the formal banking 
institution because it offers clues on how to compete in the remittance and 
previously inaccessible markets. IFTS are able to succeed in unstable and 
dangerous environments despite their lack of a formal institutional capaci-
ty or state-based foundation.227 Indeed, “[b]anks have realized that the 
pool of remittance money leaving [countries such as] the United States for 
Latin America and the rest of the world is not negligible.”228 This trend is 
likely to become more prevalent as globalization and the movement of 
groups of people continue.229 In 2005, remittance flows from the United 
States were estimated at roughly $167 million, an increase of $7 million in 
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less than a year.230 Put simply, this is a worldwide, multi-billion dollar 
industry that encompasses household income, global corporations, and 
local enterprises.231 
At the same time, providing access to the underserved and the poor 
should be integrated into any financial agenda, regardless of whether IFTS 
exist in the targeted market. In Pakistan alone, 50% of the population lacks 
access to formal or informal financial systems; about 30% have access to 
informal systems; and 14.3% have access to the formal financial sys-
tem.232 This disparity is especially disturbing, because although rural areas 
are the most underserved and the least financially literate, the same re-
gions often show the most interest in, and are the hungriest for, access to 
financial services.233 
By applying key operational characteristics found in IFTS—namely 
efficiency and accessibility, adaptability, integration, and cultural flexibili-
ty—formal institutions can improve their approach to the remittance mar-
ket, and in turn allow access to formal financial services to be expanded to 
the poor and underserved.234 Affordability of services is dependent on the 
success and presence of the other operational characteristics present in 
IFTS. By adopting IFTS-inspired techniques, formal institutions could in 
turn become a more affordable option for vast segments of the population. 
Promoting mobile banking programs, implementing adaptable banking 
procedures, integrating IFTS into the formal system, and including cultur-
al considerations in banking strategies are possible tools inspired by the 
informal networks.235 Applying these Hawala-inspired techniques will 
help formal banks maximize the positive effects of remittances for reci-
pients, communities, and countries/cities of origin, all the while improving 
access to the underserved and poor.236 
A. Efficiency and Accessibility: Mobile Banking 
In 2005, cellular phones became the first communication device to 
have more users in poor countries than in wealthy ones, and in 2010 cell 
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phone owners in poor and developing countries “accounted for two-thirds 
of the world’s 4.77 billion phones.”237 This is twice the amount of people 
who have bank accounts in those same countries.238 This trend should 
begin, and has begun, to be recognized by the banking community as a 
means to provide them with access to individuals in developing and post-
conflict regions.239 Mobile banking can provide individuals with access to 
their bank accounts or transferred funds via cell phone.240 
For example, with the assistance of the USAID, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation started the Haiti Mobile Money Initiative “to encourage 
mobile operators and banks to launch mobile money services” in Haiti.241 
Participating mobile operators offered Haitians the ability to store funds, 
purchase goods, and conduct transactions through their cell phones.242 The 
program was put into place prior to the devastating earthquake of 2010, 
and it helped provide access to services while the banks remained closed 
in the aftermath of the quake.243 
The Philippines, meanwhile, has installed a nationwide mobile bank-
ing program for rural banks as a means of tapping into the informal funds 
transfer market.244 By seeking innovative and new methods of access, 
formal institutions can “reach low-income clients who were previously 
uneconomical to serve,” as well as other participants in the remittance 
market.245 By encompassing IFTS’ key operational characteristic of acces-
sibility, mobile banking could prove to be an economical solution for 
formal banking.246 
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B. Adaptability: Financial Procedures and Services 
One of the primary challenges formal institutions face in trying to 
access the remittance market and/or trying to provide access to the poor is 
the lack of stable financial infrastructures in many of the countries with 
the greatest need.247 This is especially evident in conflict or post-conflict 
regions.248 At the same time, a functioning financial sector is crucial to 
promoting growth and reducing poverty, both of which are paramount to a 
populace’s economic and social recovery,249 even if said financial sector is 
dominated by an IFTS. IFTS’ adaptability is critical to their success. For-
mal institutions can learn from this operational characteristic by switching 
the focus of financial reform in post-conflict regions from “the brick and 
mortar of institutions” to “financial products and services.”250 This means 
providing the people with legitimate and practical financial resources, and 
not just focusing on building the financial infrastructures from scratch. 
Formal institutions should not focus on what a country does not have, but 
should focus on working with what a country already possesses. For ex-
ample: 
  if the country has “established social norms and practices 
[to] determine an individual’s financial standing,” then this 
should suffice in place of a formal credit registry;251 
  if the country has non-collateralized lending practices that 
survived the conflict, then it is not necessary to focus ener-
gy on immediately creating “an active property registry to 
facilitate collateral based lending;”252 
  if the country has a “national network of intermediaries that 
facilitate the clearance of bills of exchange,” then construc-
tion of a national payment system can wait;253 and 
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  if the country has codes of conduct enforced by member as-
sociations or traditional systems of justice, then a pruden-
tial legal framework can be eventually incorporated 
through the established code at a later date when other cru-
cial priorities have been met.254 
If the formal banking institutions initially relaxed some of their require-
ments, then it is more likely that the poor and underserved of these regions 
will want to open an account and use the bank’s services.255 
Unfortunately, many institutions venture into developing or post-
conflict regions with mandatory requirements for borrowing, transferring, 
or opening an account.256 This is an instant turn-off for many of the under-
privileged, because when “[u]sing access to credit as a benchmark, the 
perception of borrowers is that the informal sector operates with much 
lower service requirements.”257 Going back to the idea of relational con-
tracts, IFTS are more willing to enter into these transactions on the basis 
of “social contracts.”258 Requiring credit references, a credit history, and 
documentation from individuals surviving a devastating conflict is both 
unrealistic and highly insensitive to those survivors’ plight. In effect, the 
banks are putting the survivors in a position where they have to resort to 
potentially exploitative IFTS. By working with the financial building 
blocks or structures already in place—even if they are old, tattered, or 
bullet-ridden—tools for financial access can be established more quickly, 
thus providing access to financial services for those who truly need it. 
C. Broad Integration 
Outlawing IFTS is not the solution for ensuring the success of the for-
mal banking regime in the remittance market or for increasing access to 
financial instruments for the underserved, because “[t]he semi-
criminalization of small-scale money transmissions rebounds negatively 
on immigrant communities for whom these systems offer the most ... af-
fordable and reliable way to send money home.”259 Rather, success for 
both the banking world and the underserved communities could be jointly 
accomplished by broadly integrating the IFTS into the formal economy. 
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Somalia serves as an example, showing that IFTS can help a relatively 
prosperous economy exist in a failing, anarchic state. Essentially, IFTS 
can act as micro-financing institutions. Instead of operating solely outside 
the realm of banks, the IFTS can be given “access to national and regional 
payments systems and electronic retail facilities [that] will go a long way 
toward meeting the requirements of the retail and business sector in terms 
of banking facilities.”260 Not only does this promote development in re-
gions with little to no banking infrastructure, it also provides access to 
those communities that desperately need various forms of financial servic-
es.261 
The caveat is that this can prove to be extremely difficult. In addition 
to the deep-seated issues of trust that many communities face when con-
fronted with formal institutions, trying to integrate a culturally embedded 
practice into what is often deemed a western financial model can be 
viewed as a paternalistic attempt to usurp a centuries-old tradition.262 
D. Shift in Banking Culture 
In order for formal financial institutions to succeed in capitalizing on 
the benefits of migrating populations and their disposable income, banks 
need to create financial links between the diaspora communities and their 
countries of origin.263 If the formal industry wants any chance in compet-
ing with IFTS, it must recognize the need for trust through relational con-
tracts with the immigrant diasporas in the communities’ specific cultural 
context.264 Relying simply on foreign banks with American branches is 
not the solution to gaining access to the diaspora communities, as is the 
current practice in the United States.265 In fact, American banks have just 
begun to become involved in remittances within the past twenty years, 
even though the United States has the largest aggregate immigrant popula-
tion in the world.266 This simply results in higher costs for customers, 
which in turn further drives away the lucrative market.267 Unfortunately, 
promoting such a change in the long-established American banking cul-
ture could prove to be extremely difficult. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Informal Funds Transfer Systems, or Hawala networks, func-
tion successfully across the globe in spite of significant problems that 
plague formal banking transactions in the very same regions,268 it is very 
important to continue to expand research into the various IFTS. Beyond 
their shadowy reputation, IFTS function as robust financial systems that 
provide services and financial tools to large immigrant or migrant com-
munities and those left vulnerable by conflict.269 The distinct operational 
characteristics of IFTS—efficiency, adaptability, affordability, anonymity, 
cultural sensitivity, and trust through relational contracts—allow IFTS to 
fill the needs of communities that the formal banking regime has deemed 
inaccessible or uneconomical.270 As a result, the formal banking institu-
tions have limited access to the ever-growing remittance market, a market 
that is continuing to expand as populations and migration patterns shift 
both internationally and domestically.271 
Formal remittance banking is impeded by significant accessibility and 
cost issues, especially in post-conflict regions.272 Based on the success of 
IFTS in seemingly unstable regions, formal banking institutions can com-
pete through the use of innovative financial inclusion techniques. Mobile 
banking273 and adaptive banking practices274 can provide the underserved 
with the opportunity to have access to formal financial services in a much 
quicker fashion. Other possible solutions include the broad integration of 
the IFTS275 into the formal system, or a cultural shift in the banking com-
munity,276 to encompass more relational contracts. Both of these solutions, 
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however, will be difficult to implement. Regardless of these potential 
difficulties, formal banking institutions can learn lessons from IFTS in 
their attempt to provide greater access to financial services for the poor 
and underserved in developing and post-conflict regions, while profiting at 
the same time from the exponentially expanding remittance market. 
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